Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship

2008

Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National
Economy
Morgan Holcomb
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, morgan.holcomb@mitchellhamline.edu

Publication Information
8 Florida Tax Review 885 (2008)
Repository Citation
Holcomb, Morgan, "Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National Economy" (2008). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 375.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/375

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National Economy
Abstract

States constitutionally impose individual income taxes on two bases: (1) Residency: a state of residence can
tax its residents and domiciliaries and (2) Source: the state in which income is earned can tax the individual
earner. At present, there is no articulated constitutional barrier to "double taxation" of individual income. That
is, there is no requirement that the source state and residence state collaborate to tax no more than 100% of an
individual's income, and there is no requirement that only one state consider itself the "source" of a particular
item of income. In the realm of corporate income taxation the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as
requiring each state to tax only the income fairly apportioned to that state. This article argues that the
commerce clause applies to check the discriminatory taxation of individual income as well. In addition, the
article synthesizes the goals of the Privileges and Immunities Clause with those of the dormant Commerce
Clause, and demonstrates that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not occupy the field to the exclusion
of the dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, even absent application of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
article posits a separate, arguably more fundamental rationale to avoid double taxation: Both the Article IV
and the 14th Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clauses share the animating constitutional principle of
national unity and true national citizenship. Retaliatory and protectionist taxing regimes undermine the
interest in national unity, and should fall under these clauses.
Keywords

Taxation, Commerce clause, Federalism
Disciplines

Tax Law

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/375

FLORIDA TAX REVIEW
VOLUME 8

2008

NUMBER 8

TAX MY RIDE: TAXING COMMUTERS IN OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

by
Morgan L. Holcomb

I. INTROD UCTION ....................................................................................
PART I. STATE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM EXPERIMENTAL
TO INEVITABLE ........................................................................................

A. Taxation of IndividualIncome .................................................
B. Apportionment: Taxation of Business Income ........................
C. What's Good Enough for Business Income ought to be Good
Enoughfor IndividualIncome .....................................................
PART II. CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS - IN THE BEGINNING ......................
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Taxation ............
1. The Founder'sIntent: The HistoricPurposeof the
Commerce Clause ...........................................................
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Taxation:
Complete Auto Transit Test .............................................
3. Application of the Complete Auto Transit Test ...........
B. The Privilegesand Immunities of Taxation .............................

886
887

887
893
895
897
897
897
900
902
903

1. The Privilegesand Immunities Clause ofArticle IV ... 903

2. The Privilegesof Immunities Clause of the
14th Am endm ent ..............................................................

907

PART III. CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AS COMPLIMENTARY ...................

911

A. The Perilsof Double Taxation ................................................
B. ConstitutionalNorms and Commuting ....................................
1. The InterstateMarketfor Employees ..........................
2. HistoricPurposes and Modern Commuters ................
3. ConstitutionalOverlap ................................................

911
919
919
920
926
929

II. C ONCLUSIO N .......................................................................................

FloridaTax Review

[Vol 8:8

TAX MY RIDE: TAXING COMMUTERS IN OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

by
Morgan L. Holcomb*

I. INTRODUCTION

Located on the scenic St. Croix River, Hudson, Wisconsin is just a
half-hour drive from the major metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul
- "the Twin Cities" of Minnesota. Hudson is, therefore, a popular "bedroom"
community for Twin Cities' workers. Those commuters, the Wisconsin
residents who work in Minnesota, face taxation by two sovereign states:'
They are taxed by the state of Wisconsin on the basis of their residency in
Wisconsin, and they face taxation by Minnesota on the income that was
"sourced" or earned, in Minnesota. 2
It is well-settled that both states are entitled to tax at least some
portion of our Wisconsin commuters' incomes. What is less settled is the
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Hamline University School of Law. This
article was written while the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor at the
University of Minnesota School of Law. This article benefited from valuable
feedback from Mary Patricia Byrn, Mary Louise Fellows, Walter Hellerstein, Kristin
Hickman, Joel Michael, Roy Spurbeck, and Edward A. Zelinsky, as well as
comments from a University of Minnesota Faculty Workshop. University of
Minnesota students in the author's Fall 2007 Tax Policy class provided excellent
commentary and challenging questions which improved the article. University of
Minnesota School of Law Co-Deans Guy Charles and Fred Morrison provided
funding for outstanding research assistant Caroline Rummel. Special thanks to Roy,
Ella, and Ruby.
1. A third sovereign to which Wisconsin residents must pay tax is the
federal government. This article is concerned with horizontal federalism; this article
is not concerned with the propriety of taxation by the federal government and an
individual state.
2. This example is illustrative because Minnesota and Wisconsin have a
reciprocity agreement under which the states have agreed to refrain from asserting
source-based taxation against residents of the other state working within their
borders. See Minn. Stat. § 290.081 (2006). The Minnesota-Wisconsin agreement is
unusual, and the problem suggested by the hypothetical is not theoretical. In
particular, New York, a city with a huge number of teleworkers and commuters, is
notorious for its aggressive collection practices. See infra note 169, and
accompanying text.
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constitutional limit of the "double" taxation that can occur when two states
claim to be the source of income, a situation that is happening with
increasing frequency in our increasingly mobile, and telecommuting,
population. If, for example, a Wisconsin resident worked for a Minnesota
employer, but occasionally worked from home, both Wisconsin and
Minnesota could claim to be the source of the income. If both states claim to
be the source of the income, the commuter will be taxed twice on that portion
of her income, a result that doubtless seems markedly unfair to our
commuter. The question this article explores is becoming increasingly
pressing. Demographic and work place trends, along with increasingly
aggressive state revenue collection practices, 3 combine to predict that the
question of fair apportionment of individual taxation will only grow in
importance. 4
The article begins with a comparison of state taxation of individual
and business income. Part II proceeds to explore the relevant constitutional
norms: the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of both Article IV and the 14th Amendment. Part III synthesizes
these Constitutional norms and their application to commuters. Part IV
concludes with a discussion of the growing importance of this question and
the avenues for possible resolution.
PART I - STATE TAXATION OF INCOME -

FROM EXPERIMENTAL TO INEVITABLE

An understanding of the problem faced by interstate commuters
begins with an assessment of how state taxation of individual income has
developed. Those practices can then be compared to the collection practices
of business income. Part I provides that assessment.
A. Taxation of IndividualIncome
The personal income tax now seems as American as Mickey Mouse,5
and as certain as death,6 but this was not always the case. Though several
3. Gerald B. Silverman, Institute Report Says State Tax Revenues Increased
by 4.8% in First Quarter, 120 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) H-2 (Jun. 22, 2007).
4. This same predicament faces commuters who travel to major work force
centers from neighboring states, including, for example, New York City,
Washington D.C., and Chicago.
5. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the
Service of Order: Origins of the Federal Income Tax, 1861-1913, 44 J. Legal Educ.
288, 288 (1994) (book review) (noting that despite the fact that other countries use
the income tax, it "seems characteristically American").
6.
Cf.
Gary
Martin,
The
Phrase
Finder,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/death-and-taxes.html (last visited Aug. 6,
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states experimented with income taxes in 19th Century,7 it was not until the
early part of the 20th Century that states imposed income taxes with any
regularity.8 By the 20th Century, however, almost every state imposed
personal income taxes. 9 The personal income tax is now a behemoth revenue
generator, accounting for about a third of the revenues generated by the
states.' ° The federal income tax grew up roughly parallel with the state
income taxation regime." The federal government collected an income tax
during the Civil War, and then again enacted an income tax statute in 1894.12
Although the 1894 statute was struck down as a violation of the prohibition
on "direct" taxes in Article I, Section 9, clause 4,13 the 16th Amendment
permitted Congress in 1913 to enact the precursor to our modern income tax
regime.' 4 Initially very few citizens were obliged to pay the income tax,
which was imposed only on the extraordinarily wealthy.' 5 It was not until
2007), attributing the quote to various sources. Martin notes that Benjamin Franklin
used the familiar form of the phrase, "In this world nothing can be said to be certain,
except death and taxes," in a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy in 1789. Id.
7. Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, Cases and Materials 928 (8th
ed. 2005).

8. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 928-29; see also Susan Pace
Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 Ala. L.
Rev. 1, 112 n. 10 (2002) (citing 2 Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation 1 20.01 (1st ed. 1992)).
9. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 928.
10. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 929 (noting that in the period
ending June 2004, state governments collected $193.2 billion, or 33.2% of the total
state tax collections).
11. John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type
Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental
Tax Reforms, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2095, 2098 (2000) (noting that "The Federal Income
Tax has served this country well for most of the twentieth century, continuously
since 1913 (since 1909 for corporate taxpayers), and with roots even earlier than
that.")
12. William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman & Daniel N. Shaviro, Federal
Income Taxation 4-6 (14th ed. 2006); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins
of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 871-72
(1985) (providing a brief discussion of the history of the federal income tax and
noting that "The entire federal income tax system, in fact, was largely
experimental.").
13. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on reh'g,
158 U.S. 506 (1895).

14. Klein, Bankman, & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 4-6; McNulty, supra note
12, at 2098.

15. See Klein, Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 4-6 (noting that the
exemption of up to $4,000 for married couples made the early income tax a tax on
the "well-to-do"); Komhauser, supra note 12, at 873 n. 18 (noting that in 1920, only
approximately 13% of the labor force paid income taxes).
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World War II and its aftermath that the federal income tax became, as it is
today, "a mass tax"1 6 or perhaps more aptly, a tax on the masses. Most 17of us,
the masses, must file income tax returns to the United States each year.
Most of us also file income tax returns to our home state, that is,
our state of residence or domicile. 18 At least some of us, and an increasing
number of us, must also file an additional income tax return, that is to the
state or states in which we earn income, if that state is not our state of
residence.' 9 A state of residence can tax its residents on income those
residents earn, regardless of where the income is earned. 20 Residence-based
taxation is premised on the idea that residents of a state have a special
relationship to their home state. 2' As the Court put it, "[e]njoyment of the
16. Klein, Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 5.
17. In 2005, just over 52 million returns were jointly filed by married
couples, accounting for about 104 million people. Internal Revenue Service, SOI
Tax Stats, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inl2ms.xls. Approximately 2.4
million married people filed separately. Id. Almost 20 million people filed as head
of household, about 71,000 filed as surviving spouses, and just over 59 million
people filed as single. Id. Thus a total of approximately 185.5 million people filed
tax returns for tax year 2005. Id. In 2005, 56.4 million people in the U.S. were age
13 or younger, and thus most likely too young to work and have a filing requirement.
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Nation's Population One-Third Minority (May
10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/population/006808.html. Assuming that the vast
majority of the 185.5 million filers in 2005 were over age 13, it is possible to
estimate that approximately 76% of people over age 13 filed a 2005 tax.
18. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 929 (noting that "41 states
and the District of Columbia levy broad-based personal income taxes.")
19. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, State and Local Taxation: The Law and Policy
of Multi-Jurisdictional Taxation 521 (2003) (noting that states have "begun
developing apportionment rules that apply to a broader base of nonresident
individuals" and that states have "increased efforts to collect taxes from nonresident
individuals").
20. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63
(1995) (noting that it is well established that "a jurisdiction, such as Oklahoma, may
tax all the income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing
jurisdiction."); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920). Although the focus of this
article is on state taxation, it is worth noting that the United States taxes the
worldwide income of its citizens, a practice that renders the United States "an outlier
in the international community." Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global
Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443,445 (2007).
21. It seems intuitively correct that one can be a citizen of only one state at
a time. E.g., Sanford Levinson, Suffrage & Community, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 545, 554
(1989) ("We do not recognize [] dual status; thus, a citizen of Massachusetts cannot
legally also be a citizen of Rhode Island (any more than, in the United States, the
spouse of A can also be the legal spouse of B."). That intuition, however, has failed
to convince the Court that there is any due process violation when two states claim
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privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the
protection of its 22
laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs
of government.,

If the special relationship between a resident and her home state
justifies the taxation of a resident's income, some other rationale must justify
the taxation of nonresidents. Indeed, nonresident taxpayers long challenged
the ability of "source states" to tax any nonresident's income. The Court
finally laid the question to rest in the seminal case of Shaffer v. Carter23 in
which the Court firmly rejected the notion that states lacked taxing authority
over nonresidents, calling it a "radical contention" that could be "easily
answered by reference to fundamental principles. 24 One such principle is
our special brand of federalism, and the concomitant autonomy and
sovereignty of the several states that gives them "complete dominion over all
persons, property, and business transactions within their borders., 25 The
Court went on to emphasize that states have a duty to preserve and protect all
persons, property and business within their borders, and the people, property
and businesses within the states' borders have a corresponding duty to remit
taxes for those protections.2 6 The Court concluded with strident language,
"That the state, from whose laws property and business and industry derive
the protection and security without which production and gainful occupation
would be impossible, is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in the
authority to tax a decedent's estate as if the decedent were a resident. In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Virginia, New York and Virginia both assessed estate taxes on identical
income. The Court rejected a due process challenge to the assessment, holding that
"Here, the thing taxed was receipt of income within Virginia by a citizen residing
there. The mere fact that another state lawfully taxed funds from which the payments
were made did not necessarily destroy Virginia's right to tax something done within
her borders." 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938). See also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 249, 316-17 (1992) ("An American state is not like a nomadic tribe,
with membership based on kinship .... The state ...is defined by its territory, and
'its people' are defined by the territory in which they live."); Lemmon v. People, 20
N.Y. 562, 609 (1860) ("The position that a citizen carries with him, into every state
which he may go, the legal institutions of the one in which he was born, cannot be
supported."). This question of the persuasiveness of the Court's reasoning in
Guaranty Trust will be reserved for another article.
22. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937). See
generally Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a
Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1309 (1974) [hereinafter
Hellerstein, Some Reflections] (discussing the basis on which states may permissibly
tax both residents and non-residents).
23. Shafer, 252 U.S. at 57.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Id.

26. Id.
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form of income taxes for the support of the government, is a proposition so
wholly inconsistent
with fundamental principles as to be refuted by its mere
27
statement.,
Despite the Court's firm rejection of the argument that a nonresident
source state cannot tax nonresident income, there is no doubt that the
nonresident state enjoys a more limited taxing authority than a resident state
enjoys over its domiciliaries. Source states may tax only the income that is
earned in the source state. 28 The Schaffer Court noted that a State's
jurisdiction to tax nonresidents "extends only to their property owned within
the State and their business, trade, or profession carried on therein, and the
tax is only on such income as is derived from those sources., 29 Taxpayers
have "a more narrowly defined relationship 30 with states in which they are
not residents, and there is a correspondingly more circumscribed ability of
those states to tax. Unlike states of domicile or residence, states in which
taxpayers enter for a limited time do not provide the same benefits and
protections to taxpayers. 3' The jurisdiction to tax, therefore,
bears some
32
rough relationship to the benefits provided to taxpayers.
That two states are authorized to tax individual income has led to
persistent taxpayer indignation about the resulting double-taxation.
Historically, this concern has been mitigated by the residency state offering
credits for taxes collected by the source state.33 To illustrate, assume that a
Wisconsin commuters earns the 90% of her income in Minnesota. Minnesota
will tax that income because Minnesota is the source state.34 Double taxation
27. Id.
28. Id. at 57. "Source" based taxation is an international norm. Kirsch,
supra note 20, at 448-49 (noting that "all countries recognize (and most countries,
including the United States, exercise) the right of a country to tax income of a
foreign person that arises within the country's borders").
29. Shafer, 252 U.S. at 57.
30. Hellerstein, Some Reflections, supra note 22, at 1318.
31. Id. at 1319.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 71.07(7) (2006); Wisconsin Department of
Revenue Schedule OS, Credit for Net Tax Paid to Another State, available at
http://www.dor.state.wi.us/forms/2006/06i-023.pdf (explaining that Wisconsin
residents who paid tax on the same income to another state in the same tax year
qualify to claim the credit). This same practice of residence state deferring to source
state is also the norm in international taxation. Kirsch, supra note 21, at 456 ("The
foreign tax credit reflects an acknowledgment that the country in which income
arises has the first claim on taxing that income, and that a country exercising
residence-based (or citizenship-based) taxation will only collect tax on that foreign
income to the extent the source country does not.").
34. Minnesota Department of Revenue, Part-Year Residents and
Nonresidents, available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/individ/residencyand filing
_status/part_year nonresident/partyearresidentsnon.shtml (last visited Aug. 23,
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is avoided by Wisconsin's decision to give her a credit for the taxes paid in
Minnesota.35 In other words, Wisconsin will not tax that portion of her
income that was already taxed by Minnesota. The remaining 10% of her
income, perhaps income from interest or dividend income, will be taxed by
Wisconsin, but not Minnesota.
This solution, however, is imperfect. Most states grant credits only to
"source" income taxes paid, and the states have differing definitions of what
constitutes source income. 36 That is, New York taxes an individual on
income that New York considers sourced in New York, but Connecticut
taxes that same income, contending that the income was in fact sourced in
Connecticut. 37 More fundamentally, the solution is flawed because the credit

granted, usually by the State of residence, is seen not as an imperative in a
Constitutional or some other sense, but is understood as granted by the grace
of the State. 38 In other words, the credit-granting State at any moment could
change its collective mind, and repeal the credit provision.
2007) ("Part-year residents and nonresidents pay tax only on their Minnesota sources
of income .... ").
35. Wis. Stat. § 71.07(7) (2006); Wisconsin Department of Revenue Schedule OS,
Credit
for
Net
Tax
Paid
to
Another
State,
available
at
http://www.dor.state.wi.us/forms/2006/06i-023.pdf, Minn. Stat. § 290.081 (2006).
Minnesota residents are required to complete Form MICR when filing their state
income tax returns in order to claim the credit for taxes paid to other states. The
Minnesota Department of Revenue web site provides instructions to filers:
The state of Minnesota taxes all of the income of a Minnesota
resident, regardless of where it was earned. Occasionally, other
states or Canadian provinces may tax this same income if a
Minnesota resident temporarily worked ... in the other state.
To prevent double taxation of this income, a resident may file
Schedule Ml CR... to receive credit for the taxes paid.
Minnesota Department of Revenue, Credit for Taxes Paid to Another State, available
at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/individ/other-supporting-content/taxes-paid%20_to
_anotherstate.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2007).
36. E.g., Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7 (noting that it is generally
the credit granting state that "determines the sourcing rules that are used to
determine whether the state that is purporting to tax on a source basis is taxing
income that has its source in that country for tax credit purposes" which can "result
in double taxation").
37. Indeed, this was the exact situation facing law professor Edward
Zelinsky when New York and Connecticut both taxed the income he earned as a law
professor for Benjamin N. Cardozo School of law. The factual scenario is detailed in
the New York Court of Appeals decision reported at Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1009 (2004). For a
discussion of the Zelinsky case, see infra notes 204, 210 and corresponding text.
38. "It is well established . . . that the Due Process Clause imposes no
restraints on such double taxation (state power to tax based on both residence and
source)." Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 942. "To deal with the problem
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Returning to the example set out in the introduction: Let us now
assume that our commuter and her employer decide that they should
capitalize on the ease and benefits of telecommuting, and the employer
directs our commuter to work at least two days a week, or 40% of the time,
from home. They hope that this arrangement will serve them both - allowing
the employee to avoid commuting stress and be more productive, and
enabling the employer to reap the benefits of the increased productivity,
retain a valued employee and save on overhead.39 Both states now have a
legitimate claim to consider the income that the commuter earns while
working from home to be sourced to their State. If Minnesota continues to
lay claim to the income tax revenues, and Wisconsin does as well, so that so
that the commuter pays income tax on approximately 126%41 of her income,

is there any constitutional redress?
B. Apportionment: Taxation of Business Income
Now assume our commuter is not a commuter, but instead, a
business headquartered in Wisconsin doing business nationally. If our
commuter were such a multistate business, the Constitution would indeed
provide protection from multiple taxation.41 In particular, the Due Process

of double taxation resulting from the overlapping claims of power to tax on the basis
of residence and source, all states with broad-based personal income taxes provide a
credit for taxes paid by their residents to other states." Id. This same problem of
potential "double" taxation arises in the international context. In international tax
"The residence country generally eliminates double taxation by either exempting the
item of income from its tax base or by giving a credit against the domestic tax
liability for the foreign tax." Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income
Taxation: A Structural Analysis 357 (2d ed. 2004).
39. E.g., Nick Paumgarten, There and Back Again, New Yorker, Apr.16,
2007, at 58, 64, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/07041
6fa-fact paumgarten (reporting that many studies have shown that "[c]ommuting
makes people unhappy ..... ). According to Harvard political scientist Robert
Putnam, "every ten minutes of commuting results in 10% fewer social connections"
Id. Commuting can also take a physical toll on people. "Researchers have found that
hours spent behind the wheel raise blood pressure and cause workers to get sick and
stay home more often. Commuters have lower thresholds for frustration at work,
suffer more headaches and chest pains, and more often display negative moods at
home in the evenings." Eric M. Weiss, Your Car + Your Commute = A Visit to Your
Doctor, Wash. Post, Apr. 9, 2007, at B01.
40. Recall that our commuter earns only 90% of her income from her
Minnesota job; if Minnesota continues to tax 90%, and Wisconsin now taxes 40%,
she will be taxed on approximately 126% of her income.
41. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 192-325, 351-426
(discussing, respectively, Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause restrictions).
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Clause42 requires that a state not tax income earned beyond its borders, and
the Commerce Clause limits taxes to income that is "fairly apportioned" to
the taxing state.43 The Constitutional requirement of apportionment will be
discussed at length in Part II, but to illustrate, assume the business earns 40%
of its income in Wisconsin and the remaining 60% in Minnesota. Both states
can tax some of the business income, but neither state can tax 100% of the
income. 44 In fact, the states have developed relatively sophisticated
apportionment formulas and schemes to tax only the income that can be
"reasonably attributed" to that state. 45
When a company operates in multiple states, it can be quite difficult
to decide where income is "earned" and consequently it can be difficult to
determine to which state the income can be reasonably attributed. For
example, if a Minnesota company manufactures widgets in Minnesota and
then sells the widgets nationally, how will the company and the state revenue
departments determine the amount of income attributable to each state?
Assume the company makes $100 profit on the sale of a widget and the sale
42. The Due Process clause also applies to taxation of individual income.
An individual must have a nexus with the taxing state for the state to exert its taxing
authority. So long as an employee spends a minimal amount of time in the state, due
process standards are satisfied. See, e.g., Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801
N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004) ("[a] state ... may
not tax value earned outside its borders") (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div.

of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777, (1992)).
43. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) ("The Due
Process Clause 'requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a
state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax."' (quoting Miller Bros.
Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)); Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (setting forth a four-prong test that state taxes must
pass to be constitutional per the Commerce Clause; the prongs include (1) the taxing
state must have a substantial nexus to the tax, (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned
to services provided by the taxing state; (3) the tax must not discriminate; and (4) the
tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the State).
44. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) (holding that both Minnesota and Iowa could tax the income earned by a
corporation because, although the corporation was headquartered in Iowa, it made
sales in Minnesota as well as Iowa); Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 (the tax
must be fairly apportioned to services provided by the taxing state); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (a state is not required to apportion by
identifying geographical source of the corporations profits as long as it's

apportionment method provides a "rough approximation of a corporation's income
that is reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing State.").
45. To be sure, the states are at times aggressive in reconfiguring their
apportionment schemes so as to apportion to themselves as much income as
possible. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920);
Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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occurs in Iowa. The near impossible administrative task of determining how
much of the profit should be attributed to (and therefore taxable by) Iowa and
how much of the profit should be attributable to (and therefore taxable by)
Minnesota has led states to settle on apportionment.
Almost all states that impose a corporate income tax use some
variation of a three-factor apportionment formula in an attempt to
approximate the amount of income attributable to a taxing state. 4 The factors
almost universally include sales, property, and payroll, and the goal is to
make a satisfactory, albeit rough, estimate of how income should be divvied
up amongst the states. These three factors were chosen because each factor
represents an asset commonly understood to contribute to the ability to
generate income.47 Several states have tinkered with the weight given to each
factor, a common maneuver is to double-weight the sales factor, 48 but in
broad strokes, there is consensus on how to apportion the income of
multistate businesses. Importantly, there is no dispute that apportionment is
required.
C. What's Good Enoughfor Business Income ought to be Good Enoughfor
IndividualIncome
The states have apportioned corporate income for years, but fail to
apply those well-settled apportionment rules apply to taxation of individual
income. 49 The resistance to application of the apportionment schemes
probably has several bases, but a prime suspect is that because relatively few
individuals earn their income in a state that is not their home state, the states
have not had to address apportionment. 50 Even when an individual does cross
46. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 440 (noting that the threefactor test is the most widely used formula).
47. See, e.g., Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., The Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act Re-Examined, 46 VA. L. Rev. 1257, 1261-62 (1960) ("On the basis of
a trial and error process, the so-called Massachusetts formula evolved as the most
common general apportionment method. The three factors of sales, payroll, and
property were selected as representative income producing elements.").
48. Approximately half of the states imposing a corporate income tax put
additional weight on the sales factor, usually double. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra
note 7, at 440.
49. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y.
2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004) (arguing that "The taxpayer's crossing of
state lines to do his work at home simply does not impact upon any interstate market
in which residents and nonresidents compete so as to implicate the Commerce
Clause," but nonetheless applying the Complete Auto Transit test and finding that
even if it did apply to Zelinsky's situation, it would not be violated by New York's
convenience of the employer test for allocation of income).
50. More than 73% (94 million) of all commuters in America work and live
in the same county. Alan E. Pisarski, Commuting in America III xv (Transp.
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state lines to work, it historically has been easier to "locate" income earned
by an individual than income earned by a multi-state company. If a factory
worker commutes from Michigan to Ohio each day to work in the Ford plant,
for example, there's not much question that the worker's income is earned in
Ohio and is therefore taxable by Ohio. So long as the employee does his or
her work in the "source" state, there is relatively little dispute about which
state gets to tax the income. The rise of telecommuting, 5' and the continuing
shift in our economy from a goods to a service economy 5 2 changes that
dynamic. An increasing number of workers structure their employment much
like our hypothetical commuter outlined in the introduction - working for an
employer in one state from a home in another. In those situations,
determining which state, or states, proPerly lay claim to the income tax
revenue becomes a difficult question. Should the state in which the
employer is located tax all of the income? Should the employee's state of
Research
Bd.
of
the
Nat'l
Acad.
2006),
at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/CIAIII.pdf. This is changing, however, as
51% of all new workers in the 1990s worked outside of their counties of residence.
Id. See also John Leland, Off to Resorts, and Carrying Their Careers, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 2007, at Al (reporting that 'location-neutral' migrants" make up a
growing percentage of the population of resort towns such as Steamboat Springs,
Colorado and Nantucket, among others, and that "[flrom 2000 to 2006, population in
the 297 counties rated highest in natural amenities by the United States Department
of Agriculture grew by 7.1%, 10 times the rate for the 1,090 rural counties with
below-average amenities").
51. Elizabeth Olson, Executive Life: At Home (Of Course) with a
Telecommuter, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2003, at 11 ("Telecommuting has become
more popular over the years, and interest spiked after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11,
2001. According to an estimate from the International Telework Association and
Council, which tracks telecommuting, the number of wage earners who work
exclusively from home has increased to roughly 17 million from 5.5 million a
decade ago."). Furthermore, the trend is poised to continue. In a 2003 survey by
Spherion Corporation, a Fort Lauderdale-based staffing and recruiting company,
96% of respondents agreed that an employer was more attractive when it helped
them meet family obligations through options like flextime, telecommuting, or job
sharing. Inst. of Mgmt. and Admin., Inc., Is Your Firm Ready for the Impending
War for Talent? Your Employees Are!, 06-3 Law Off. Mgmt. & Admin. Rep. 2
(Mar. 2006).
52. William J. Holstein, And Now a Syllabus for the Service Economy,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2006, at 10 (noting that the U.S. economy is about 75% services
and stating that universities must prepare students to succeed in a services-based
economy).
53. Cf. Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform
of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 975, 984 (1997)
(arguing that international tax policy should move away from source-based taxation
given the difficulty of "associating items of income and expense with a particular
geographic location").
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residence tax it all? Or should the states do in individual taxation what they
do in the corporate income tax realm - determine some rough way to
apportion the income to the state in which it was more properly considered
earned?
PART II - CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS - IN THE BEGINNING

Two constitutional norms help in the inquiry set out above. The first
is the dormant Commerce Clause, and the second is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. This Part will explore the historic purpose of each of
these clauses, tracing commonalities among the dormant Commerce Clause
and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses. Those commonalities, and their
import for telecommuting taxpayers, are then explored in depth in Part III.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrineand Taxation
1. The Founder's Intent: The Historic Purpose of the Commerce
Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is the notion that even in the absence
of Congressional action, the States may not discriminate against or burden
the flow of interstate commerce.54 Economic protectionism by the states
during the time of the Articles
of Confederation 5 was a key concern of the
56
drafters of the Constitution.

54. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 245
(15th ed. 2004).
55. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 94 Ky. L. J. 37, 49 (quoting Cathy Matson, The Revolution, the
Constitution, and the New Nation, in 1 The Cambridge Economic History of the
United States: The Colonial Era 363, 373 (Stanley L. Eugerman & Robert E.
Gellman, eds., 1996) ("[t]he centrifugal, contentious economic interests rising
among the states" at the time "dampened ... postwar enthusiasm and reoriented
public and private views toward the Nationalists," who warned that "discrimination
against the commerce of neighboring states weakened the economies of all states.")).
56. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949)
("The necessity of centralized regulation of commerce among the states was so
obvious and so fully recognized that the few words of the Commerce Clause were
little illuminated by debate."). See also Denning, supra note 55, at 49.
The inability of the Continental Congress to harmonize the
commercial policies of the several states, and its failure to
convince states to part with that much of their sovereignty as
would permit Congress to regulate commerce and raise revenue of
its own, convinced many fence-sitters that the problem lay with
the Articles of Confederation and encouraged moderate
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State policies, including "[d]ifferent state taxation policies" were of
especial concern as those policies "weakened the economies of all states."57
For example, New York and Massachusetts, states with major ports, "took
advantage of their superior position in international commerce and in
regional markets to pass discriminatory duties against neighboring states'
traffic at their ports, while weaker states tried to divert trade to themselves by
abolishing duties altogether, thus setting parameters for intense interstate
rivalries by mid-1785. 58
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison addressed the economic
protectionism problem in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 7,
discussing possible conflicts between the states, Hamilton noted that,
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful
source of contention. The States less favorably
circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the
disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each state, or
separate confederacy, would
pursue a system of commercial
59
itself.
to
peculiar
policy
Hamilton also foresaw the troubles that would arise in areas where people of
neighboring states participated in multi-state markets. For example, New
York relied on revenue from laying duties on imports arriving through its
ports. New York's practice resulted in residents of New Jersey and
Connecticut also paying higher prices for goods, but without the benefit of
the duty revenue accumulating in their states' coffers. 60 Hamilton thus asked,
"Would Connecticut and 'New
Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York
61
for her exclusive benefit?
James Madison also referenced the detrimental effect of economic
competition between the states on the stability of the union.
"We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice
[states imposing duties on imports and exports through their
nationalists, like James Madison, that the survival of the Union
necessitated substantial changes in the constitutional regime.
57. Cathy Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation,
in 1 Cambridge Economic History of the United States: The Colonial Era 363, 377
(Stanley L. Eugerman & Robert E. Gellman, eds., 1996). "Merchants in Providence,
Rhode Island, believed that they were virtually barred from trade by 1785 because of
the high state duties at Massachusetts and New York ports." Id. at 381.
58. Id. at 380.
59. The Federalist NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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borders] would be introduced by future contrivances; and
both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that
it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably
terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility. 6 2
He was concerned not only about the harm to national unity that this
would cause, but also the inefficiency of such a practice, noting that "the
desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue
from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is
unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as
interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. 63
The economic conflict among the states was so alarming to many
that it has been cited as "the immediate cause that led to the forming of a
[constitutional] convention." 64 Granting the commerce power to Congress in
the Constitution was a means of providing the national government with the
power to prevent the states from harming national unity and the national
economy through economic protectionism. 65 The Commerce Clause
"embodied a grant of authority to Congress that created the conditions for the
free movement of people, transport of products and capital, and uniform
66
institutions that, together, proved crucial to establishing a national market.,
In the absence of congressional legislation regarding an area of commerce,
the Supreme Court enforces the anti-economic protectionism purpose behind
the Commerce Clause by striking down state discrimination against interstate
commerce through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. 67 When
analyzing state action that impacts interstate commerce, avoiding "economic
Balkanization" has become one of the "central purposes of [the Supreme
Court's] negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 68

62. The Federalist NO. 42 (James Madison).
63. Id.
64. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
571 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 77 (9 Wheat. 1) (1824) (Johnson, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
65. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 55, at 245 ("The framers of the
Constitution centralized the power to regulate interstate commerce in the Congress
because they viewed destructive trade wars among the states as a major problem
under the Articles of Confederation.").
66. Matson, supra note 57, at 385.
67. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 54, at 245.
68. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 577.
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2. The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Taxation: Complete
Auto Transit Test
When a business engages in economic activity in more than one
state, each of those states will be interested in taxing the business's income.
Naturally, the business will want to avoid taxation in the new state if
possible, and the home state will want to maintain its tax base. "Conflict
between the states' interest in exercising their essential taxing power and the
nation's interest in fostering economic unity has been an enduring feature of
our federal system., 69 The Supreme Court noted in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota that the issue of state taxation of interstate
commerce was so contentious that by 1959 the Court had issued over 300
opinions addressing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes.7 °
Over time the Supreme Court developed a test to determine whether
a state tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause. When a state tax is
challenged as violating interstate commerce, the Court applies the four-part
Complete Auto Transit test to determine whether the tax rises to an
unconstitutional level.7 ' Complete Auto Transit was decided in 1977,
wrapping up the Court's journey from holding interstate commerce to be
wholly immune to state taxation to allowing
interstate commerce to be taxed
72
by any levy that can pass the four-part test.

69. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 192.
70. See id. at 193.
71. Readers familiar with dormant Commerce Clause challenges to non-tax
regulatory laws are doubtless familiar with the "Pike balancing test." The Supreme
Court does not appear to apply Pike to challenges to state taxes. Though the
Supreme Court has not articulated why the Pike balancing test is not applied in state
tax discrimination cases, others have noted that the language in Pike refers only to
"regulatory" measures (Robert Z. Kelley, Over the Long Haul: State Court Decisions
on Flat Truck Taxes, 42 State Tax Notes 103 (Oct. 9, 2006)., quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that
regulatory fees fall under the Pike balancing test because fees do not have to be
apportioned and do not have to satisfy the internal consistency test. See Franks &
Sons, Inc. v. State, 966 P.2d 1232, 1234-35 (1998), cited in 42 State Tax Notes 103.
As taxes do have to meet both of those qualifications (fair apportionment and
internal consistency), they must pass the more complex Complete Auto Transit test the Pike balancing test does not do a sufficient analysis to determine the
constitutionality of a taxing measure. See id. See also Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal
Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on
State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138 (1988) ("Because the distinction between a
'regulatory fee' - subject to the Pike balancing test - and a tax - subject to the
Complete Auto four prong analysis - is fuzzy at best, States will likely continue to
defend questionable taxes under both theories.").
72. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 193-205 (summarizing
the Supreme Court's changing analysis of state taxation of interstate commerce).
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Before setting forth the 4-part test, it is useful to outline the Court's
journey to that point. Initially, the Court reasoned that any tax on interstate
commerce constituted a regulation on that commerce, and such regulations
were entirely barred due to Congress's power to regulate the privilege of
74
doing interstate business.7 3 This was the "wholly immune" era of the 1870s.
By the 1930s, the Court had progressed to holding that interstate commerce
can be made to "pay its way," but would still strike down any tax which had
even a possibility of imposing a multiple tax burden on the taxpayer. 75 After
allowing states to begin taxing the income of interstate businesses, the Court
had trouble reaching a clear standard to determine whether states were
requiring businesses to do more than just pay their way. The Court's
reasoning reached a point where it elevated form over substance, disallowing
taxes that were directly imposed on interstate business, but not on indirectly
imposed taxes.76
After three decades of cases in which the outcome often turned on
the label the state gave the taX, 77 the Court articulated its four-factor test in
Complete Auto Transit to determine whether a state's tax on corporate
income imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.78 The four
factors considered are
(1) Nexus: the tax must be applied to an activity that has a
substantial nexus with the state;
(2) Apportionment: the tax must be fairly apportioned to
activities carried on by the taxpayer in the state;
(3) Discrimination: the tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and
(4) Fairly related: the tax must be fairly related to services
provided by the state.79
73. See The Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872);
Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 193-98.
74. See The Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872);
Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 193-98.
75. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938); Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 198-201.
76. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951);
Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 201.
77. After the Spector Motor Service decision in 1951, many states changed
the name of their corporate income taxes from "franchise taxes on the privilege of
doing business" to "direct net income taxes." Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note
8, at 202. This practice did not end until 1977 when the Complete Auto Transit
decision overruled Spector and "explicitly rejected the formalistic Commerce Clause
doctrine that provided the foundation for the Spector rule." Id. at 204.
78. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
79. Id. at 279.
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Each state in which the taxpayer does business has an interest in
taxing some of the taxpayer's income, but only to the extent that the taxpayer
receives benefits from the state.80 The Court's test recognizes that when a
taxpayer does business in more than one state, a perfect outcome would be
for the taxing states to apportion the income such that the taxpayer would be
subject to tax on 100% of its income, no more and no less. This way
interstate business taxpayers are treated the same way as businesses
operating in only one state - they are both taxable on all of their income, but
no more than that.
3. Application of the Complete Auto Transit Test
A state seeking to impose an income tax on a business engaged in
interstate commerce may tax only an apportioned amount of the business's
income; the apportionment scheme must be intended to reflect the business
activity conducted in the state.8 ' This apportionment requirement is a critical
prong of the Complete Auto Transit test. When apportioning corporate
income, the most commonly used method is the so-called "Massachusetts82
formula," which includes the three factors of property, payroll, and sales.
States can and do choose other methods of apportionment, such as the singlefactor sales test and a three-factor test with a double-weighted sales factor.83
When analyzing a state apportionment formula, the Court considers whether
the formula shows "internal consistency." 84
Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a
tax identical to the one in question by every other State
80. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992), quoting
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (noting that Due Process requires
that the income the state seeks to tax have a rational relation to "values connected
with the taxing State" and that such a relation could be established by a showing that
the state provides protection and services to the taxpayer's local activities).
81. See Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123,
133 (1931).
82. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 47, at 1261-62 ("On the basis of a trial and
error process, the so-called Massachusetts formula evolved as the most common
general apportionment method. The three factors of sales, payroll, and property were
selected as representative income producing elements.").
83. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Corporate Apportionment
Brief #11 (2005), available at
and the "Single Sales Factor," Policy
http://www.itepnet.org/pb IIssf.pdf.
84. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Tyler Pipe Indus.,
483 U.S. 232 (1987); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995) (noting that the "principle of
fair share is the lineal descendant of [the] prohibition on multiple taxation.").

2008]

Tax My Ride

would add no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate
commerce would not also bear. .

.

. A failure of internal

consistency shows as a matter of law that a State is
attempting to take more than its fair share of taxes from the
interstate transaction.
It is possible for two states to have apportionment formulas which conflict,
resulting in double taxation, but which are both internally consistent.
The Court also asks whether a tax is "externally consistent." That is,
the tax must be "fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing
state."86 Unlike the tidy thought experiment required by the internal
consistency test, external consistency looks to "the economic justification for
the State's claim upon the value taxed" with the goal of discovering
"whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly
attributable to economic activity within the taxing State." 87 The external
consistency test is therefore a practical check on taxes that could pass the
internal consistency test, but would nonetheless impermissibly burden
commerce.
B. The Privilegesand Immunities of Taxation
1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV
Like the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV of the Constitution 88 prohibits states from discriminating
against non-residents. 89 And like the goal of national unity underlying the
85. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
519 U.S. 278, 299 n.12 (1997) ("the requirement of apportionment... assur[es] that
interstate activities are not unjustly burdened by multistate taxation")
86. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185 (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.
252, 262 (1989)).
87. Id.
88. The Article Four Privileges and Immunities Clause is referred to as the
"interstate" Privileges and Immunities Clause. It provides that "[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2.
89. Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 290-91 (1998)
(concluding that "because New York has not adequately justified the discriminatory
treatment of nonresidents . . . the challenged [tax] provision violates the Privileges
and Immunities Clause."). Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause speaks of
discrimination against "Citizens" the Court held that "a general taxing scheme ...if
it discriminates against all non-residents has the necessary effect of including in the
discrimination those who are citizens of other states." Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920). See also Susan M. Cordaro Note, A High Water Mark:
The Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause and Nonresident Beach
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Commerce Clause, a goal motivating this additional anti-discrimination
provision was "to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent,
sovereign States." 90 Although the Clause arguably has multiple purposes, it is
"first and foremost a national unity provision, eliminating a source of
interstate divisiveness.' 91
As expressed by Chief Justice Taney, the Clause seeks to ensure the
avoidance of "discord and mutual irritation" among the states. 92 Taxes especially taxes one State attempts to export to another State's residents historically have been, and continue to be, a prime area for states to provoke
each other to such discord and irritation.9 3 This practice of filling the state

Access Restrictions, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2525, 2563 n. 21 (2003) ("The Supreme
Court has come to view 'citizen' and 'resident' as terms that are 'essentially
interchangeable' as part of Article IV, § 2, Privileges and Immunities analysis.")
(quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975))).
90. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). See also Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 523 (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
"establishes a norm of comity that is to prevail among the States with respect to their
treatment of each other's residents.") (citation omitted); Laycock, supra note 22, at
270 ("The specific concerns that underlie the Privileges and Immunities Clause
inform the more general right of equality in the Equal Protection Clause and the
equality component of the Commerce Clause.").
91. Laycock, supra note 21, at 263 (further citing Alexander Hamilton's
statement that the Clause was "the basis of the Union.") (citing The Federalist NO.
80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
92. Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, (1849)
(Taney, C.J., dissenting) (" [a] tax imposed by a State for entering its territories or
harbours is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens of other States as
members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain.
Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation,
and they very clearly do not possess it.")
93. The Federalist NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton); Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975); see also The Capital-Journal Editorial Board, Border
Dispute
A
Tax
War,
Topeka
CJOnline,
at
www.cjonline.com/stories/082507op 1_
194425567.shtml, (last visited Oct. 2, 2007) (reporting that Kansas and Missouri are
involved in "another border skirmish" over tax treatment of nonresident commuters
and foreshadowing a "never-ending battle between state legislatures"); Rick
VanderKnyff, MSN Money, Could You Be Hit by the "Jock Tax"?, available at
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/P 1 12 8 7 2 .asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2007)
(noting that the source-based income taxes states impose on professional athletes
arose when California retaliated for the Chicago Bulls' defeat of the L.A. Lakers in
the 1991 NBA Finals; other states quickly followed suit in imposing their own 'Jock
taxes").
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fisc by imposing taxes on outsiders is known as tax exporting. 94 In an early
case, the Court addressed States' attempts to ease the tax burden on their
own residents by imposing entry taxes on non-residents. 95 The majority
struck down the tax as violating the Commerce Clause.96 Chief Justice
Taney, in dissent, set forth his opinion that no State may impose a tax for
entering its "territories or harbours" because such a tax "is inconsistent with
the rights which belong to the citizens of other States as members of the
Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain., 97 In
other words, such a tax violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause as well
as the Commerce Clause. Although the Chief Justice was in dissent, his
opinion "set the groundwork for a right to travel. 9 8
As the Court more recently put it, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause "places citizens of each State upon same footing with citizens of
other states, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned." 99 One such advantage of citizenship is "the right of a
citizen of any State to remove to and carry on business in another [State]
without being subjected in property or person to taxes more onerous than the
citizens of the later State are subjected to." 100 The Court recognizes that
taxing authority is fundamental to state sovereignty and as such the Court has
noted that its "review of tax classifications has generally been concomitantly
narrow." 10 1 However, when state tax authority pushes up against "an activity
granted special constitutional recognition" that deference to state taxing
authority yields so that the Court may "protect the competing constitutional
value. 1 °2
94. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic & Political Look at Federalism in
Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1992) (defining tax exportation as occurring
"when governments succeed in placing tax burdens on outsiders."); see also
Hellerstein, Some Reflections, supra note 22, at 1333 (striving to find the
"constitutional line [that] must be drawn in a manner that allows the state to exercise
its taxing power freely but not so freely that it is allowed to care for its own at the
expense of others.")
95. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
96. Id. at 409-410, see also Michelle L. Himes, Note, Constitutional Law You Can't Take it With You: The Constitutionality of Workers' Compensation
Rules Based on Residency, 27 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 261, 277-78 (2005).
97. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting).
98. Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Lynchpin of Liberty in an Age of
New Federalism Replacing Substantive Due Process with the Right to Travel, 45
Brand. L. J. 469, 494 n. 91 (2007).
99. Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296 (1998)
(quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, (8 Wall), 168, 180 (1869)).
100. Id.
101. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975).
102. Id.
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Despite its anti-discrimination promise, the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not bar all disparate treatment of citizens and noncitizens." 3 In particular, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not bar
all disparate taxation treatment of citizens and non-citizens. °4 "[I]nequalities
that result not from hostile discrimination, but occasionally and incidentally
in the application of a [tax] system that is not arbitrary in its classification,
are not sufficient to defeat the law."' 5 If a non-resident demonstrates a
taxing scheme results in something less than "substantial equality of
treatment"' 0 6 for resident and nonresident taxpayers, it is up to the State to
articulate a "reasonable ground" for the difference.'0 7 States may defend
challenged actions by demonstrating a substantial reason for the difference,
and showing that the discrimination bears a substantial relationship to the
State's objective.'"°
With relative frequency, the high court has held that a state has not
sufficiently articulated a reasonable ground for the different treatment of
non-residents, and has held a particular tax or fee violates the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 10 9 In a paradigmatic case, Toomer v.
103. See Lunding, 522 U.S. at 298 ("The Privileges and Immunities Clause
bars 'discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other
States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where
there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it."') (quoting Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 396)). Note that in this way, the Clause differs from the Dormant
Commerce Clause; under current Supreme Court doctrine, any tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce is per se invalid. But see Laycock, supra note 22, at 259
(arguing that the "Court should be reluctant to imply exceptions to any of these [the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Commerce
Clause] protections.")
104. Lunding, 522 U.S. at 297 ("the Privileges and Immunities Clause
affords no assurance of precise equality in taxation between residents and
nonresidents of a particular State.").
105. Id. at 297 (quoting Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 543 (1919)).
(alteration in original).
106. Id. at 297 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665
(1975)).
107. Id. at 298 (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79
(1920)).
108. Id. For a succinct and accessible description of modem doctrine,
Brannon P. Denning, Why The Privileges & Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot
Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 384, 388-93
(2003).
109. See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation: Third Edition, Part IV,
20.06[1] "Discrimination Against Non-Residents Under Privileges and Immunities
Clause" (1998) (discussing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)); Hellerstein &
Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 86-89 (discussing Toomer, 334 U.S. 385, Mullaney v.
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Witsell,"10 the Court invalidated South Carolina's shrimping license fee that
charged non-residents one-hundred times more than South Carolina residents
for the privilege of shrimping in South Carolina's coastal waters."' The
license fee cases demonstrate clear examples of prohibited state action. They
also illustrate, however, a critical limitation on the scope of the interstate
Privileges and Immunities Clause. That limit is that only certain
"fundamental" rights - those rights "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation
as a single entity" are protected.12 The Court has consistently held that
pursuit of a common calling is a fundamental right." 3
2. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment
While the Court has discussed the interstate, or Article IV, Privileges
and Immunities Clause in numerous tax cases, the Privileges or Immunities
114
Clause of the 14th Amendment has not figured prominently in tax cases.
Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522
U.S. 287 (1998), Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975)).
110. 334 U.S. 385. See also Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,
430 (1871) (striking down a state law that, among other things, charged nonresidents
a higher license fee than those in-state residents who were required to secure
licenses).
111. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 385 (the statute charged resident-owned boats $25
for a license to shrimp, while charging non-resident owned boats $2,500).
112. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383
(1978). The understanding of what rights are "fundamental" is undeveloped, at best,
as is discussed infra.
113. E.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
219 (1984) ("Certainly, the pursuit of a common calling is one of the most
fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause."). While shrimping for a
livelihood qualifies as a "fundamental" privilege or immunity, hunting big game for
sport does not. The high court made this latter point express when it upheld
Montana's licensing scheme that charged resident elk-hunters significantly lower
fees than non-resident elk-hunters. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371 (1978). See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate
Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1504 (2007) (questioning why national unity is
less threatened by discrimination surrounding recreation than commercial activities;
noting that the distinction between the shrimp and elk cases "reveals the commercial
flavor of the Court's view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it leaves
unexplained why resentment and retaliation outside the commercial context is less
threatening to the nation's well-being.").
114. Indeed, the 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause has not
figured prominently in any subject of the Court's jurisprudence. William J. Rich,
Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional
Canon, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 153, 207 (2002) (lamenting that "The current generation of
lawyers and judges has been trained to ignore the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.").
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This later Privileges or Immunities Clause instructs that "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.""' 5 For over 100 years, the Privileges or
Immunities clause of the 14th Amendment was "all but read ... out of the
Constitution" by the Slaughter-House Cases. 1 6 In 1999, however, the Court
reinvigorated the Clause, holding that the clause protects the right to
travel." 7 In particular, the Court held that the 14th Amendment prohibits
States from impeding "the free interstate passage of citizens"' " 8 and held that
California's cap on welfare benefits for newly arrived residents violated the
Privileges and Immunities of the State's new residents."19
Like the interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
the 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities clause, as the Saenz Court
noted, protects only "fundamental" rights. 20 Though the precise definition of
what constitutes a fundamental right is unclear, 12 1 it seems certain that two
115. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Although the Amendment refers to "citizens"
the Amendment protects residents as well. Rich, supra note 115, at 195 (quoting
D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, 14th Amendment, 4 Iowa L.
Bull. 219, 240-41 (1918) ("privileges or immunities of a United States citizen
include rights conferred upon him by national law, whether it is conferred upon him
because he is a citizen, or because he is a human being. .. [I]t is none the less a
privilege of citizens of the United States' that others have the same privilege.")
116. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J. dissenting)
(noting that "Unlike the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses ...the Court all
but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution in the SlaughterHouse Cases."). The Court has not completely ignored the Clause, however. E.g.,
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 431, 433 (1935) ("One purpose and effect of the
privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment ...was to bridge the gap
left by [Article IV, Section 2] so as also to safeguard citizens of the United States
against any legislation of their own states having the effect of denying equality of
treatment in respect of the exercise of their privileges of national citizenship in other
states ....When [a citizen] trades, buys, or sells, contracts or negotiates across the
state line, when he loans money or takes out insurance in New Hampshire, whether
in doing so he remains in Vermont or not, he exercises rights of national citizenship
which the law of neither state can abridge ....
")
117. According to then Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Saenz case "breathe[d]
new life into the previously dormant Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th
Amendment." Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court's
revitalization reinvigorated academic interest. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral
Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. Rev. 393, 457 (2003) (noting that "the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is experiencing academic revival").
118. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511-12 (1999) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Metzger, supra note 113, at 1504 (stating "The Court's efforts to
render this standard [the 'fundamental' right standard] operational again have not
been models of consistency.").
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such rights relevant here include the right to commute; or as it was phrased
in the early 19th Century in a discussion of the IV Amendment, the "right of
a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise...,,122 and
the right to be free of discriminatory taxation, or, again, as phrased in the
landmark 123 Corfield opinion, "an exemption from higher taxes or
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state....
.
Combined, these rights have been explicitly recognized by the Court
at least twice: first, in Ward v. Maryland,' 5 and then again in Hicklin v.
Orbeck.126 The Hicklin Court summarized the protection afforded by the
clause: "a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to another
State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory restrictions in
favor of state residents imposed by the other State.' ' 127 This right to work in
another state is the second
of three components of the right to travel that the
28
Saenz court articulated.

The shared goal of national unity that underpins both the Commerce
Clause and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause is also an aim

122. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
Similarly, the Saenz majority defined as "fundamental" the right to travel. Reference
to Corfield to define the privileges and immunities to which the 14th Amendment
applies is sound: "The meaning of the terms 'privileges' and 'immunities' did not
change when they were repeated in the 14th Amendment." Rich, supra note 115, at
215. See also Michael P. O'Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia
About the History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 KY. L. J. 659, 701-02
(2005) (noting that the most obvious place to begin understanding the meaning of
"privileges or immunities" in the 14th Amendment is by reference to the
"nineteenth-century understanding of the original privileges and immunities clause")
(citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
123. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (referring to Corfield v.
Coryell as "Justice Bushron Washington's landmark opinion.")
124. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230). See also Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of
U.S. & EU Approaches, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 47, 82 (2005) (noting that "the freedom
from discriminatory taxation had previously been named as a fundamental right.")
(citing Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Non-residents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. Rev. 379 (1979) (citing Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230))).
125. 79 U.S. 418 (12 Wall.) (1870).
126. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
127. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525 (citing Ward v. Maryland 79 U.S. 418 (12
Well.) (1870)).
128. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500, the first component is the right of a citizen of
one state to enter and leave another, and the final component is the right to be treated
like other citizens once one elects to become a resident of that state. Id.
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animating the 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. 2 9 Indeed,
recent scholarly effort addressing and valuing the 14th Amendment
Privileges or Immunities 30Clause emphasizes the critical national building
component of the Clause.'
William J. Rich, for example, undertakes a careful examination of
the historic context of the 14th Amendment, and persuasively concludes that
the 14th Amendment changed [the] federal balance and "strengthened the
values of nationhood, equality, and democracy.' 131 Professor Rich
emphasizes the "central importance of national citizenship and democratic
control" to the Amendment. 132 Rich notes the majority opinion for the
Slaughterhouse cases identified four sources of federal privileges or
immunities: negative constraints in the text of the Constitution; rights
derived from the "national character" of the government; 133 "federal
privileges or immunities incorporated [into] the 'right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances;""' 134 and finally, the "right to use the
navigable waters of the United States."' 135 As Rich points out, this last
category is "fundamental" and reflects that the "right to use navigable waters
referred to the Commerce Clause."' 36 This constitutional overlap that Rich
identifies - the right to use navigable waters that is present in both the
understanding of federal privileges or immunities and explicitly in the
Commerce Clause - illustrates the critical role this interest plays in our

Union.

129. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 AM.
U. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1999) (attempting "to dispel the notion that the limitation on a
state's power to restrict interstate travel and migration is based upon a notion of a
personal right to travel" . . . and instead positing that "this limitation, like the
dormant Commerce Clause, is traceable to an idea of conserving the political and
economic union against provincial state interests.") (citation omitted).
130. E.g., Rich, supra note 114; James W. Fox, Jr., Democratic Citizenship
& Congressional Reconstruction: Defining & Implementing the Privileges &
Immunities of Citizenship, 13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 453 (2004)
(considering the "implementation of the 14th Amendment during Reconstruction
through the lens of democratic citizenship"); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the
Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987)
("While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not. In its place arose
a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment.")
131. Rich, supra note 114, at 158.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
134. Id. at 181-82 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
135. Id. at 181-82, (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
136. Id. at 182.
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PART HI - CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AS COMPLEMENTARY

Part III begins with an exploration of the perils of double taxation,
and proceeds to demonstrate that the dormant Commerce Clause, which 1is
37
said to protect "markets and market participants, not taxpayers as such"'
does in fact protect the "market" for employees, and therefore should provide
solace to interstate commuters and teleworkers. This Part also synthesizes the
goals of the Privileges and Immunities Clause with those of the dormant
Commerce Clause, and demonstrates that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not occupy the field to the exclusion of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Even if the dormant Commerce Clause did not apply to interstate
commuters, both the 14th Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the dormant Commerce Clause were, and continue to be, concerned with
national unity and true national citizenship. Retaliatory and protectionist
taxing regimes undermine the interest in national unity, and therefore are
constitutionally prohibited.
A. The Perils of Double Taxation
Double taxation doubtless seems unfair to an individual taxpayer,
but its impact on the overall economy is even more pernicious. Fairness in
itself is a basic building block of a good taxing system. 38 Fairness is
admittedly a hazy concept, but for the purposes of this article, a
straightforward characterization borrowed from scholar Linda Beale will
suffice: a fair tax system is one in which "taxpayers ... believe that they will
not be required to pay too much tax in comparison to other taxpayers.' 39
Fairness is important for its own sake, but fairness and the perception of
fairness are also critical when tax systems rely significantly on voluntary

137. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
138. E.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity & the Corporate Tax
Shelter Debate: Assessing the Proposed Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor,
24 Va. Tax Rev. 301, 359 (2004) (stating that "As any introductory tax text makes
clear, the three concerns traditionally considered determinative of tax policy are
fairness, efficiency, and simplicity.")
139. Id. at 371. See also Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Filling in
the Tax Gap, N.Y. Times Magazine, Apr. 2, 2006, at 26 (setting forth evidence that
the average (federal income) taxpayer underpays by about one-fifth, and arguing that
"unless you are personally cheating by one-fifth or more, you should be mad at the
I.R.S. - not because it's too vigilant, but because it's not nearly vigilant enough.
Why should you pay your fair share when the agency lets a few hundred billion
dollars of other people's money go uncollected every year?").
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140
compliance, as ours do.
Compliance is more likely when taxpayers believe
141

that the system is fair.

To the extent that a taxing system requires interstate commuters to
pay more than similarly situated intra-state commuters, the double-taxation is
perceived to be, and is, unfair. This perception of unfairness chips away at
the taxpaying public's142faith in the tax system. This is a serious critique given
the current "tax gap."'

The fairness problem is illustrated by analogy to the taxation faced
by professional athletes. After the Chicago Bulls defeated the L.A. Lakers 1in
43
the 1991 NBA Finals, California got even by enacting the first "jock tax."'
When a professional athlete plays an away game, the city and/or state where
the game is played will tax the athlete's income earned that day, claiming it
is sourced in that jurisdiction.144 The tax is most commonly calculated using
a ratio of "duty days," where the number of days the athlete is required to be
in the taxing city/state for team duties is divided by the total
number of days
4
in the year the athlete is required to perform team duties. 1
While many of these taxes apply to all people entering a state to
work and earn income, professional athletes and entertainers are the most
common targets of this tax because their schedules are public and announced
in advance, giving tax administrators easy access to the information they
need to assess the tax. 46 The targeting of athletes based on their high salaries
140. E.g., Id. (noting that "most people aren't cheating" on their federal
income taxes, and reporting that experts estimate "that the U.S. is easily within the
upper tier of worldwide compliance rates").
141. Beale, supra note 138, at 371.
142. E.g., Dubner & Levitt, supra note 139, at 26 (discussing in general
terms the federal income tax "tax gap"). The "tax gap" is not a uniquely American
problem. See Eric J. Lyman, Vatican Officials Say Papal Encyclical Will Condemn
Tax Evasion, Tax Havens, BNA Daily Tax Report, No. 158, Aug. 16, 2007 at I-1
(reporting that Pope Benedict XVI has equated tax evasion to stealing and will
release "an encyclical that will condemn tax evasion as 'socially unjust;' and
further reporting that "statements from the Vatican... can have an impact on the
behavior of individuals or companies and on policy in poor and predominantly
Catholic countries in Latin American, Africa, and parts of Asia.").
143. Rick VanderKnyff, Could You Be Hit by the Jock Tax?, MSN Money,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/P112872.asp (last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
As of 2006, 20 states had enacted a jock tax. Mike Baker, State Lawmaker Proposes
"Retaliation" Tax on Athletes, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/258384__gjockO6.html.
144. See Thomas Heath and Albert B. Crenshaw, In Professional Sports,
States Often Claim Players; 'Jock Tax' follows Athletes to Their Places of Work,
Wash. Post., Feb. 24, 2003, at DOI.
145. Id.
146. See Schoettle, supra note 19, at 521 ("The state can calculate the time
an athlete spends in the state without an expensive audit, can identify the employer,
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and public work schedules strikes some as unfair, especially considering that
other highly paid individuals have an easier time flying under the radar.' 47 In
addition, it is not just the highly paid athletes who bear the burden of this tax
- it is also assessed against trainers, coaches, and lower-paid athletes who all
travel with the team as well. 148 Athletes end up paying large sums of money
49
to accountants to help file all of their additional state income tax returns.
Even those who are opposed to the ever-increasing salaries paid to athletes
could agree that imposing taxes on people merely because they are easy to
track is not fair. In addition, using the tax system as a tool in this way merely
serves to drive the targets
of the tax to find more ways to insulate themselves
150
from state taxation.
The taxation of professional athletes has attracted a fair amount of
scholarly attention, but commuters with less exciting jobs are similarly
impacted. The question of the fairness of taxing, or over-taxing commuters,
has been brought into stark relief in two recent cases in which New York's
highest court held against two non-resident taxpayers -5 one, a law professor,
and the other an information technology professional.' '
In the first case, law professor Edward Zelinsky challenged New
York's ability to tax as "source" income monies he earned while working at
his home in Connecticut. Cardozo Law School - the institution for which
Zelinsky taught - is located in New York.152 Zelinsky performed many of
his duties, however, at his home in Connecticut. 53 Zelinsky commuted three
days each week during the semester, and when school was not in session and
and in general can enforce tax laws against this population with far more ease than
other professionals who earn salaries from activities carried on in nonresident
states.").
147. See Heath and Crenshaw, supra note 144 (quoting David K.
Hoffmann, an economist with the Tax Foundation, as saying "'It's not fair [that] just
because this particular occupation is so easy [to track] and no one feels bad fore [sic]
the rich players that they have to pay these taxes."). But see VanderKnyff, supra note
143 (noting that states are becoming more aggressive in trying to tax CEOs and
-lawyers by auditing company travel records). An aggressive state revenue
department could easily target trial lawyers, whose appearances in court are matters
of public record. Although perhaps not as lucrative as taxing professional athletes, a
trial team in a month-long, complex civil trial could easily bill in excess of a quarter
of a million dollars.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 801
N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004); Huckaby v. Tax
Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 829 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 546 (2005).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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during his sabbatical leave in the fall semester of 1995, he worked
exclusively at home. 54 Zelinsky argued that New York should be permitted
to tax as source income only the percentage of income he earned while he
was physically in New York.'" Similarly, Thomas Huckaby, a resident of
Tennessee, worked primarily from his Tennessee home for a New York
employer. 156 Mr. Huckaby presents perhaps a more compelling case, because
his time in New York was even more limited than that of Professor Zelinsky
- Mr. Huckaby spent only 59 days in New York in the first tax year at issue,
and only 62 days in New York in the second tax year at issue. 157 Another
factor making Huckaby arguably more sympathetic is that a daily commute
for Huckaby would not have been just inconvenient - it simply would not
have been possible. When Zelinsky prepared his tax returns, he "apportioned
to New York the percentage of his total salary that reflected the number of
days he commuted to the law school."' 58 Similarly, when Huckaby filed his
returns, he "allocated his income between New York and Tennessee based
on the number of days he worked in each state relative to the total number of
days he worked in each tax year."' 59 The New York State Department of
Zelinsky's and Huckaby's returns,
Taxation and Finance disagreed with 16both
0
and assessed deficiencies upon audit.
In separate cases, both teleworkers challenged the deficiencies.
Zelinsky raised Commerce and Due Process Clause challenges to the
assessment;'16 Huckaby did not raise the Commerce Clause argument, but
challenged the assessments on Due Process grounds. 162 The New York Court
rejected both appeals, and upheld the assessments. 163 The propriety of the
Court's decision will be discussed below,' 64 what is remarkable here,
however, is the criticism these decisions received in both academic and

154. Id. at 833-34. By my calculations, Professor Zelinsky spent no more
than 90 days working in New York during the tax year in which he did not take a
sabbatical.
155. Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Huckaby, 829 N.E.2d at 277-78.
Id. at 278.
Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 843-44.
Huckaby, 829 N.E.2d at 278.
Id. at 278; Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 844.

161. Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 844.

162.
interpretation
281.
163.
164.

Huckaby, 829 N.E.2d at 281. Mr. Huckaby also raised a statutory
argument, not relevant here, that was rejected by the court. Id. at 279Huckaby, 829 N.E.2d at 285; Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849.
See infra notes 204- 210 and accompanying text.
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popular press. 165 One academic commentator noted that New York's practice
of aggressively taxing non-residents such as Zelinsky and Huckaby violates
"the Due Process Clause, Commerce Clause, and Privileges and Immunities
Clause... principles." 166 In a short opinion piece published in the New York
Times, the cases were criticized as unfair, and the author concluded, "The
country needs telework to help address the health, energy, transportation and
homeland security challenges before us, and New York's thirst for
67
nonresident revenue simply can't take priority.'0
In addition to the fairness problem, discriminatory taxation of
commuters has the potential to impact the flow of capital, impair commerce,
and alter or impair individual travel and work habits. Although all taxes have
some effects on individual behavior, 168 discriminatory taxes can create
deadweight social losses. As Daniel Shaviro explains, "When [taxes] cause a
taxpayer to substitute an activity for the one she would otherwise prefer in
order to reduce her tax liability, they create a deadweight social loss in the
amount of the reduced pretax benefit to the taxpayer by reason of the
substitution."' 169 In other words, if a Connecticut resident would prefer to live
in Connecticut and work in New York City, but because of double taxation
she either foregoes the New York job, or moves to New York, a deadweight
social loss is created. This inefficiency and corresponding deadweight losses
165. See, e.g., Molly McDonough, Telecommuter Tax Case is Closely
Watched, 4 A.B.A. Journal Report 2 (Jan. 14, 2005) (calling the case "closely
watched" and noting that "upwards of $100 million in tax revenue" was at stake).
166. William V. Vetter, A Critique of The Empire State's "New"
Convenience of the Employer Rule, J. of Multistate Taxation & Incentives 14, 23
(Feb. 2007). See also Meredith A. Bentley, Huckaby v. New York State Division of
Tax Appeals: In Upholding the Current Tax Treatment of Telecommuters, the Court
of Appeals Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action, 80 St. John's L. Rev.
1147, 1166 (2006) (criticizing the decisions in Huckaby and Zelinsky, and
concluding that "the onus is on the legislature to put an end to the unfair tax
treatment of telecommuters").
167. Nicole Belson Goluboff, Taxing Telecommuters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6,
2006, at § 14CN, at 13.
168. Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 900 ("taxes
inevitably have income effects - by reducing the taxpayer's wealth, they affect her
behavior").
169. Id. See also President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform,
Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix American's Tax System 36 (2005)
[hereinafter
President's
Advisory
Panel],
available
at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov
/final-report/TaxReformCh3.pdf (explaining efficiency costs as follows: "When
taxpayers change their behavior to minimize their tax liability, they often make
inefficient choices that they would not make in the absence of tax considerations.
These tax-motivated behaviors divert resources from their most productive use and
reduce the productive capacity of our economy.").
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"waste economic resources, reduce productivity, and, ultimately lower living
standards for all. 17 °
Despite all the drags that double-taxation puts on our national
economy, states remain sorely tempted to export taxes and generate revenues
from non-residents. States often give in to that temptation, after all, the
demands on states' fiscs continue to grow, and non-residents who earn
substantial revenue in the state present what must appear to legislators and
revenue authorities as a bull's eye target as they drive across the state line to
come to work.' 7 ' This problem of tax exportation promises 7to
2 continually
become worse as our economy becomes ever more integrated. 1
Non-residents, of course, are also non-voters, and as such, have a
much more difficult time finding relief in the state legislature. 73
Nonresidents historically have also faced a difficult time finding relief in the
Congress. 174 Although a recent bill, The Telecommuting Tax Fairness Act,
has been introduced in both the House and Senate, 175 Congressional
intervention in state and local tax matters has been nearly nil over the two

170. President's Advisory Panel, supra note 167, at 36. A telling example of
such deadweight social losses was recently reported by the New York Times. CBS
C.E.O. Leslie Moonves amended his contract with CBS so that CBS will pay any
state or local taxes Moonves might incur by living in California but occasionally
working in New York. Patrick McGeehan, Getting Too Big For His Own Taxes?,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2007 at B2. These legal costs and related expenses would be
unnecessary if Mr. Moonves could rely on consistent tax treatment.
171. New York's revenue department is notorious for its aggressive
collection practices. See, e.g., Nicole Belson Goluboff, New York Makes it Official:
Double Taxing of Telecommuters Will Continue, 40 St. Tax Notes 877, 877-79
(2006) (urging Congress to "remind New York that the state's hunger for
nonresident revenue does not trump the nation's need to prepare for emergencies"
such as pandemic flu and energy crises).
172. Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 902 ("Today's more
integrated national economy presents far greater opportunities than existed in 1787
for states in effect to reach across their borders and tax nonconsenting
nonbeneficiaries.")
173. E.g., Metzger, supra note 113, at 1484 (noting "It seems fair to expect
that states will downplay harms to out-of-state interests for in-state gain, at least
when out-of-state interests lack effective in-state surrogates.").
174. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 897. But see
Kaye, supra note 124, at 54, 66-67 (noting a "historic reluctance of Congress to
intervene in state taxation" but also noting that "in the last decade, there has been an
increase in interference with state tax systems").
175. Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 1360, 110th Cong.
(2007); S.785, 110th Cong. (2007). Both bills were introduced by Connecticut
politicians: Representative Chris Shays and Senator Chris Dodd.
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hundred years of union.'7 6 Commentators dispute whether Congress would
adequately protect state interests in this realm. Tracy A. Kaye, for example,
argues that "Congress is causing more harm than good in the name of
avoiding tax discrimination and should exercise the legislative restraint it
historically had shown to the taxing powers of the states. 177 Another
respected scholar, Edward Zelinsky argues, on the other hand, that it is time
to restore politics to the dormant Commerce Clause and "scrap the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibition on discriminatory taxation."' 178 Zelinsky
suggests that taxpayers with complaints about discriminatory taxation take
those complaints to "Congress or to the legislature imposing those taxes. 179
Regardless of whether Congress would adequately protect states'
interests, or the interests of individual commuters, nonresidents challenging
state taxes have had little success in Congress. Similarly, nonresident
taxpayers have had relatively little success in their complaints to state courts
or in the United States Supreme Court. Nonresidents face potentially hostile
state courts - courts with at least some incentive to protect the treasury on
which their paychecks are drawn. Nonresident taxpayers might avoid the risk
of parochial state courts by bringing suit in federal court, however, litigants
must clear several hurdles to successfully maintain a suit in federal court.
This is no easy task. First, the taxpayer must surmount the Tax Injunction
Act, 180 the federal statute prohibiting federal courts from enjoining the
collection of state taxes unless there is no adequate state court remedy. The
Tax Injunction Act has been interpreted "liberally to impose a strict bar on
federal court jurisdiction to entertain challenges to state taxes, except in the
rare situation where the plaintiff can demonstrate that it has no adequate

176. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 897 (noting that
"for two hundred years Congress has almost never used these [Commerce Clause]
powers to constrain state and local discretion in the tax area").
177. Kaye, supra note 124, at 70-71. Kaye marshals the legislation that
Congress has been willing to pass, including the State Taxation of Pension Income
Act of 1995 (preventing states from taxing certain retirement income of former
residents) and the Intemet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) (preventing certain sales taxes
on internet access and on some internet purchases) to conclude that "Congress does
not represent the states and there is increasing temptation to enact legislation that
benefits a select constituency at a revenue cost to the states." Id. at 70.
178. Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The
Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory
Taxation, 29 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 29, 29 (2002) [hereinafter Restoring Politics]. See
also Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon Denning, The Future of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U.
Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 196 (2007)..
179. Id. at supra note 176, at 30.
180. 128 U.S.C. § 1341.
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remedy in the state courts." 18 ' Even if the taxpayer meets the strictures of the
Tax Injunction Act, the challenger must also satisfy federal prudential and
and the Court has been parsimonious in
constitutional standing requirements,
82
standing.1
taxpayer
permitting
Even if a taxpayer has standing, another challenge taxpayer litigants
face is the perception, if not the reality, that the Supreme Court is more
deferential to states when states are exercising their taxing authority than in
other instances of challenges to state power. 183 One explanation for that
deference is that the Supreme Court "regards the power to tax as at the heart
of a government's sovereignty.' ' 18 4 Indeed, a sovereign's "authority to
impose taxes is one of its most pervasive and fundamental powers."' 85 Even
if the taxpayer finds a friendly state court, or can maintain an action in
federal court, yet another intensely practical hurdle exists - money. The costs
will frequently outweigh
of bringing litigation to challenge a tax collection
86
taxpayer.
individual
an
for
reward
the potential
181. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 1114 (citing California v.
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982) ("[B]ecause Congress' intent in
enacting the Tax Injunction Act was to prevent federal-court interference with the
assessment and collection of state taxes, we hold the Act prohibits declaratory as
well as injunctive relief'). See also Kaye, supra note 124, at 55 (noting that "In the
U.S. judicial system, taxpayers normally have to challenge a state tax in state
court.").
182. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006)
(dismissing for lack of standing where state taxpayers' claims that a particular tax
incentive violated the Commerce Clause); Kristin Hickman, How Did We Get Here
Anyway? Considering the Standing Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 Geo.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 47 (2006). See also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007) (discussing the limitations of taxpayer standing).
183. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 942 (discussing
this perception).
184. Id. Shaviro continues, "Another explanation is that the Court simply
lacks confidence in its ability to understand tax cases and resolve them intelligently,
and thus prefers to let most challenged tax cases stand." Id. This second explanation
is less persuasive. Although the Supreme Court might lack confidence to tackle
highly technical federal income taxation questions, it is unlikely that the Court lacks
confidence in its ability to discern questions of constitutional law, and it is questions
of constitutional law that many state and local tax disputes raise. The authors of the
leading textbook on state and local taxation, Hellerstein & Hellerstein, dedicate the
majority of the book to constitutional questions.
185. Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye,. Restricting the Legislative
Power to Tax in the United States, 54 AM. J. Comp. L. 641, 641 (2006) (citing The
Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the power to tax as the most
important of the legislative powers)).
186. E.g., Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization, 527 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1974)
(permitting a class action challenging a state sales tax because "[t]he amount due
each member of the class is relatively small and when compared with the costs of
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B. ConstitutionalNorms and Commuting
With the perils of double-taxation fir-mly in mind, the article now
turns to a more specific exploration of how the Constitution protects our
national economy from double-taxation. This part explains why the
Commerce Clause 8 7 applies to this question, and then turns to the
Constitutional overlap of the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses.
1. The Interstate Marketfor Employees
It is somewhat awkward to consider commuters - people - as articles

of commerce. Nonetheless, it is "settled beyond question" that individuals
are indeed articles of commerce, at least for dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.1 88 Perhaps it is less unseemly to think about the Commerce Clause
as protecting the market in which states compete for residents£ or the market
in which employers compete for employees. The dormant Commerce Clause
trigger is flipped regardless of whether we consider the teleworkers articles
of commerce themselves or we consider the market for those workers the
triggering event. In any case, given the clear impact on interstate commerce,
there is no persuasive reason that the Complete Auto Transit test should not
apply to individual personal income taxation just as it applies to taxation of
business income. The historic purpose of the clause dictates that it applies to

suit, would discourage individual legal actions."). Note, too, that "in the absence of a
waiver of immunity, the taxpayer cannot ordinarily recover interest on an
unconstitutional levy." Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 1096.
187. See generally Walter Hellerstein, Reconsidering the Constitutionality
of the "Convenience of the Employer" Doctrine, 2003 State Tax Today 235-16 (May
12, 2003) (suggesting that the Due Process clause prevents states from taxing
individual income on an unapportioned basis when that income is earned in another
state which also has power to tax a portion of the income).
188. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941); Mary Sarah Bilder,
The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of
Commerce, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 743, 745 (1996) (asserting that "People are articles of
commerce, or so the United States Supreme Court held in 1941, emphasizing that the
issue was 'settled beyond question."' (quoting Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172)). Bilder
notes the uneasiness that comes with considering individuals to be items of
commerce, she cites Justice Jackson's discomfort with the theory that "the
migrations of a human being .. . are commerce." Id. (citing Edwards, 314 U.S. at
182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Bilder's article demonstrates good reason for
that discomfort; she argues that "the Court's nineteenth-century opinions on
immigration under the Commerce Clause reveal the shadows of slaves and
indentured servants." Id. at 749.
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interstate commuters' plight. 89 That the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine applies is even clearer after consideration of recent case law,
including the Court's opinion in Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison. 190 Rather than pre-empting application of the dormant Commerce
Clause to our commuter's complaint, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses
of both Article IV and the 14th Amendment complement, and provides an
independent constitutional means for relief for our commuter.
2. HistoricPurposes and Modern Commuters
Over 200 years after Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
expressed their concerns about economic competition between the states, the
national economy has not (yet) been destroyed by state rivalries. 91 As states
fund increasingly expensive and expansive services, however, they must turn
more and more to increasing taxes to generate revenue. 192 As the pressure to
raise revenue grows, states compete with each other to try to attract more
business and more high-income-earning residents. 193 This competition not
only implicates Hamilton and Madison's concerns about harm to national
unity, but also can leave interstate commercial actors, including teleworkers,
fending off attempts by states to tax more than a fair share of their income.
By its terms, the Complete Auto Transit test applies to cases
involving taxation of businesses engaged in interstate commerce. The Court
has not used the Complete Auto Transit test to analyze an individual person's
interstate commercial activity, at the same time, the Court has not expressly
held that the four-part test does not apply to the taxation of individual
189. But c.f., Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate Style:
First Notes on a Theme From Saenz, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 1133, 1237 (2002) (arguing
that the Commerce Clause doesn't need to cover this situation, because "At least as
high a standard of protection is or ought to be available under the 14th
Amendment.").
190. 520 U.S. 564, 572 (1997).
191. C.f., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377
(1996) (suggesting that the national economy has in fact been damaged by such
rivalries).
192. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at v (noting that since 1952 tax
revenues collected by state and local governments have increased almost fifty-fold;
an "astronomical tax increase[]" that "reflect[s] comparable increases in state and
local government expenditures" attributable in part to inflation but also in substantial
part to "the broadening of the nature and scope of state and local government
services").
193. E.g., Enrich, supra note 191, at 377 (discussing the "vicious cycle" of
state and local incentives and its pernicious effect on interstate relations and on the
states themselves).
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income. 194 At least one state court to address the question, however, insists
that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to the taxation of
individual income. 195 The New York Court of Appeals continues to maintain
that "[t]he taxpayer's crossing of state lines to do his work at home simply
does not impact upon any interstate market in which residents and
nonresidents compete so as to implicate the Commerce Clause." 196 This
conclusion does not withstand scrutiny.
Though the Supreme Court has not expressly held that commuting
trips the dormant Commerce Clause test, the Court has noted that the
crossing of state lines by individuals constitutes interstate commerce. 197 The
Court has also long recognized that individual activity can affect interstate
commerce when looked at in the aggregate.1 98 It does not matter that the
imposition on commuters impacts only a portion of the stream of interstate
commerce: "The imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream
of commerce - from wholesaler to retailer to consumer - is invalid, because
a burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state
producer.1

199

The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Camps Newfound/Owatonna
v. Town of Harrison supports the application of the dormant Commerce
Clause to the taxation of commuters' income. In Camps Newfound, the
194. The question was raised in the appeal from Zelinsky, but the Court
denied certiorari. The petition for certiorari posed the question as follows: "1) On
days when New York's "convenience of the employer" rule risks double taxation of
nonresident telecommuters for working at their out-of-state homes, does that rule,
and the risk of double taxation the rule causes, violate the Commerce Clause? 2) On
days when New York's "convenience of the employer" rule risks double taxation of
nonresident telecommuters for working at their out-of-state homes, does that rule,
and the risk of double taxation the rule causes, violate the Due Process Clause?"
Petition for certiorari at i, Zelinsky, 541 U.S. 1009, 2004 WL 322430.
195. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 801
N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1009 (2004).
196. Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 847. The court's position in Zelinsky is even
more confounding considering the court's previous holding in City of New York v.
State of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 577,597 (2000) that transportation of persons is
interstate commerce.
197. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
572 (1997) (disagreeing with the Town's argument that campers are not articles of
commerce). The Court has addressed so-called "commuter taxes." A commuter tax
is essentially an entry tax on out-of-state workers. In Austin v. New Hampshire the
Court struck down these blatantly discriminatory taxes. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
198. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See also Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 586 ("The interstate commercial activities of
nonprofit entities as a class are unquestionably significant.").
199. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 580 (quoting West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994)).
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Court held that a Maine property tax exemption for charitable organizations
which excluded charities operated principally for the benefit of non-residents
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 200 The Court rejected the town's
argument that campers were not "articles of commerce," and invoked the
dormant Commerce Clause, noting that campers' travel to attend the camps
"necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has
long been recognized as a form of 'commerce."' 20 ' Rejecting the notion that
economic protectionism includes only state attempts to provide advantages to
in-state merchants, the Court noted that it also may include attempts to
provide advantages to in-state consumers.2 °2
The Court reiterated that "a State may not tax a transaction or
incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely
within the State. '20 3 Finding the Maine property tax exemption to be facially
discriminatory,2 °4 the Court strictly scrutinized, and subsequently struck
down, the exemption statute. 20 ' A few campers choosing to camp in one state
or another might appear trivial, and not a threat to the national economy. But
the Court reminds us that the facts must be considered in the aggregate, and
in the aggregate, there is no doubt that summer campers impact commerce.20 6
Camps Newfound illustrates how the Zelinsky court erred.20 7 The
Zelinsky Court supports its conclusion by suggesting that because it is a
personal decision to live in Connecticut, and work in New York, the
Commerce Clause is not implicated.2 8 This conclusion misses the point. Just
as the camper's choice, most likely for personal reasons, to cross state lines
in Camps Newfound triggered dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of a tax,
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 583 n. 16.
206. Id.
207. The plaintiffs urged the New York Court to consider the Supreme
Court's opinion in Camps Newfound. See Reply Brief of the Appellants Edward A.
And Doris Zelinsky at 2, 4, Zelinsky v. tax Appeals Tribunal for the State of New
York, 801 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1009 (2004).
Inexplicably, the Zelinsky Court did not cite or discuss Camps Newfound. Walter
Hellerstein provided an earlier critique of the intermediate court's decision in the
Zelinsky case. See Walter Hellerstein, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of the
"Convenience of the Employer" Doctrine, 2003 State Tax Today 235-16 (May 12,
2003).
208. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 801
N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1009 (2004). The Zelinsky court
distinguished Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-68 (1975), in which the
Court held that state imposition of higher tax rate for nonresidents violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
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so too does the crossing of state lines by commuters like Zelinsky. The
impact of commuters on the national economy cannot be denied. As one
leading Federal Income Tax text puts it, "[t]he mobility of labor is an
important and necessary part of the nation's economy, since it reduces
unemployment and increases productive capacity. 2 °9
The Zelinsky court referred to commuting as a "personal choice" of
the taxpayer. 2 10 No doubt personal preference plays a role in where to live
and to some extent where to work. Indeed, the federal tax code considers
commuting to be a "personal" expense, and does not allow deductions for
commuting. 211 At first blush, the federal treatment of commuting expenses as
personal might provide fodder for the conclusion that interstate commuting
does not trigger the Commerce Clause. The lack of a federal deduction for
commuting expenses, however, has been criticized as disingenuous. As one
casebook puts it, "If it is a 'personal' decision to decide where to live, it is
equally a 'business' decision to decide where to work., 212 In fact, the goal of
neatly separating expenses into business (and therefore deductible) and
21 3
personal (and therefore not deductible) is subject to cogent criticism.
Furthermore, the decision to deny a personal income tax deduction for
commuting expenses is efficient: whether a person chooses a long commute
or a short commute, her tax liability will not change as a result of her
decision, and thus tax considerations should not impact her choice. Double
209. Klein, Bankman, & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 445 (citing a 1970
Congressional Report).
210. Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 847 (noting that Zelinsky's "voluntary choice
to bring auxiliary work home to Connecticut cannot transform him into an interstate
actor").
211. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5) (2007); Klein, Bankman, &
Shaviro, supra note 12, at 445. The federal government does, however, allow
taxpayers to elect to use up to $215 a month in pre-tax wages to pay for their parking
at work. William Neuman, Mixed Signals: Driving to Work as a Tax Break, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 2007, at Al. At the same time, as the Neuman article points out, the
federal government has recently made it a priority to discourage people from
driving. The tax-break for parking, coupled with the new Department of
Transportation grants to discourage driving is described as a "perverse" example of
government policies working at cross-purposes. Id.
212. Klein, Bankman, & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 445.
213. E.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of
Employment-Related Child-Care Expenditures, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 307, 38893 (1998) (arguing that the "business/personal distinction does not produce
predictable and widely accepted results" and further observing that "the difficulty of
distinguishing business and personal expenditures is far more complex than merely a
problem of determining taxpayer intent. The problem with the distinction is that it
marks business expenses as productive, and personal expenses as unproductive in a
way that misapprehends productivity in the home and nonproductivity in the
marketplace.").
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taxation of nonresident commuters, however, is inefficient. If a person faces
double taxation as a result of his decision to live in one state and work in
another, his tax liability will be affected by his choice, and tax considerations
almost certainly will impact his decision of whether to maintain this
arrangement. Rather than making his choices of where to live and work free
of tax considerations, his decision will now be impacted by the knowledge
that he could avoid double taxation by moving to the state of employment or
finding a new job in the state of residence.
Taxpaying commuters challenging discriminatory taxation could
find an unlikely ally in Justice Scalia, elsewhere a vehement opponent of the
Court's Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. Scalia's dissent in Camps
Newfound makes clear that he is willing to apply the doctrine to overrule
state taxes that facially discriminate against interstate commerce.2 14
Particularly, Scalia quoted Justice Jackson's statement in H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond that the "vision of the Founders" was "that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he
will have free access to every market in the Nation .... 25 While Scalia
argued against the applicability of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
to the Maine tax in Camps Newfound, the tax in the case was not truly an
economic protectionist measure in the way that aggressive taxation of
interstate commuters is protectionist, and thus his opposition to the use of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in that situation is unlikely to carry
over to a commuter tax apportionment situation. Scalia thought that the
Maine statute was best viewed as "a narrow exemption for organizations that
provided services the state might otherwise provide., 216 He did not think that
providing a tax break to an organization that relieved the state of providing
social services was something that implicates interstate commerce. 217
The concept that the Commerce Clause protects the right of every
farmer and craftsman to have free access to every market in the nation is not
just an anachronism; the concept is commonplace in judicial decisions today.
The Eighth Circuit decided Jones v. Gale in 2006, holding that a Nebraska
constitutional amendment prohibiting corporations or syndicates from
acquiring interests in Nebraska real estate used for farming or ranching (with
certain exceptions) violated the dormant Commerce Clause by favoring
Nebraska residents and people who were in close enough proximity to
Nebraska farms and ranches to make a daily commute.21 8 The court
214. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 206.
215. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Karin J. Kysilka, Recent Development: A Jurisdictional Vacuum in the
Wake of Camps Newfound/Owatonna?, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 288, 294
(1997).
217. Id. at 294.
218. Jones v. Gale, 470, F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (8th Cir. 2006).
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particularly noted the advertisements that had run during the ballot initiative
to adopt the constitutional provision, which encouraged people to vote for it
in order to "send a message to those rich out-of-state corporations., 21 9 The
court did not find any of the state's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for
adopting the provision to outweigh the harm done by denying non-residents
access to the Nebraska farm market. 220 The Jones v. Gale decision explicitly
applies the Commerce Clause to interstate commuters.
As commuting across state lines becomes a more common work
arrangement, states are unsurprisingly able to take advantage of the situation
to reap more than may be fair from non-resident employees. The world of
work has changed since the time of the drafting of the Constitution.221 People
are able to live in one state and work in a place much farther away than
would have been possible years ago.222 As cities and states compete to attract
workers to strengthen their economies,22 3 they also face the increasing ability
of workers to separate the choice of where to live from the choice of where
to work.224 By placing a greater tax burden on people who work in their state
but not live there, states with many commuter employees are able to provide
themselves with some protection in the market for residents, as well as the
market for workers,22 5 in contravention of the principles behind the
Commerce Clause.226
219. See id. at 1270.
220. Id. at 1267-69. The Jones v. Gale decision is open to criticism on a
number of counts-including the Court's questionable assessment that the anticorporate farming provision purposefully discriminated against interstate commerce.
The case is cited here not because it is necessarily a persuasive example of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but simply to illustrate how courts are analyzing
the issue.
221. See generally Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 192 ("With
the rapid growth of large-scale industry and the foreshortening of distances through
modem transportation and communication, state lines lost much of their economic
importance. At the same time the increasing demands upon the states for schools,
roads, relief, and other social services forced them to seek out every available source
of revenue.")
222. See, e.g., David Schultz, 16 Touro L. Rev. 435, 435 (2000) ("The
nature of work and employment in America has changed dramatically in the last
twenty to thirty years.... People often choose or are required to work in certain
places that are located in a different jurisdiction, county, or state from where they
live.").
223. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Cities Compete in Hipness Battle to Attract
Young, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2006, at Al; Karen Brune Mathis, To Keep Young
Workers, Keep Attention on Downtown, Fla. Times-Union (Jacksonville), Feb. 24,
2006, at D1.
224. See Schultz, supra note 222.
225. See Dewan, supra note 223; Mathis, supra note 223. Cf. Christina
Gostomski, More Local Income Taxes May Go Unpaid, Moming Call (Allentown,
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3. ConstitutionalOverlap

Although the Commerce Clause "provides the strongest
constitutional bulwark against hostile state regulation and taxation of the
national economy" 227 it is not the only constitutional norm implicated by the
situation of our double-taxed commuting taxpayer. Indeed, academic
commentators, and the Court itself have found a "mutually reinforcing
relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
section 2, and the Commerce Clause - a relationship that stems from the
common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation and
their shared vision of federalism., 228 As one scholar recently phrased it,
"[w]here economic activity of nonresident individuals is involved, the
demands of the dormant Commerce Clause and Article IV largely
overlap. 229
That interstate commuting taxpayers may appeal to the Commerce
Clause to challenge discriminatory taxation does not mean that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause has no place in the double-taxed commuter's arsenal.
The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause is in fact the more typical
Pa.), May 6, 2007, at Al (discussing the high amount of unpaid Pennsylvania local
income taxes and noting that a major source of the problem is the increase of

nonresident employees from neighboring states).
226. See Paul J. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a
Multistate Business, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 21, 21-22 (1960), quoted in Hellerstein &
Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 193:
If one state in order to supply her fiscal needs or promote the
commercial and economic well-being of her citizens may shield

them from competition from sister states by the taxing process, we
have opened a Pandora's box of troubles in the nature of reprisals
and trade wars that were meant to be averted by subjecting
commerce among the states to the power of the federal
government.
227. Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1764, 1764 (2004). But see
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (referring to the privileges and
immunities clause: "It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has
tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as
this.").

228. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531-32. See also Laycock, supra note 21, at 259,
270 (noting that "Much of the Constitution addresses the task of creating one nation
out of separate states, and of doing so without abolishing those states." Further
noting that "The same constitutional principles of national unity and interstate
equality are at work in all three [Commerce, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal
Protection] clauses.").

229. Metzger, supra note 113, at 1507.
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clause trotted out when a state seeks to prohibit or restrict nonresidents from
working within the State's borders. 230 The Privileges and Immunities Clause
expressly protects the rights of nonresidents.23'
Because the Privileges and Immunities Clause speaks quite directly
to the treatment of interstate commuters, it has been argued that the dormant
Commerce Clause cannot also apply.23 2 Such an argument rests on cannons
of statutory construction, and particularly on the notions that implied
language cannot trump express language in the same legal document and that
implied repeals are strongly disfavored.233 It is unclear, however, that the
"regular" rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to
234 Our Constitution is, after all, a unique
interpretation of the Constitution. 234
235
document.
Scholars have wondered whether "special canons of
construction, not applicable to any ordinary legal documents, [can] be
derived from the Constitution's unique context and purpose?, 236 Even if the
generic rules of construction apply, however, the better reading is that the
Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clauses should be read in
concert, rather than in tension. It is not the case that the protections afforded
by the Commerce Clause repealed those provided by the Privileges and
Immunities clause.
It is the combination of these clauses - read together in both historic
context and as the clauses have developed along with our national economy,
that I wish to emphasize. Read together, these clauses provide a sound
argument for our weary and overtaxed commuter. As one scholar put it,
"[t]he non-discrimination component of right to travel case law introduces an
element of affinity with the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and the
privileges and immunities clause." 237 The interaction of these constitutional
230. See infra notes 89 to 114 and accompanying text discussing the history
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See also Robert J. Firestone, Does a
Commuter's Choice of Where to Reside Implicate the Dormant Commerce Clause?,
49 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 943 (2004-2005) (suggesting that because the Privileges and
Immunities Clause applies, the dormant Commerce Clause should not apply to
protect the interests of interstate commuters).
231. See infra.
232. Firestone, supra note 227, at 943.
233. Id. at 950-51.
234. E.g., Caleb Nelson, Originalism & Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 519, 555 -556 (2003) (noting the radical nature of our written
constitution and asking, "Did such a document trigger the rules of interpretation
applicable to an ordinary statute? To a treaty? To a contract?").
235. Id. at 556.
236. Id. (further asking "If so, what were those canons?")
237. Francesca Strumia, Citizenship and Free Movement: European and
American Features of a Judicial Formula for Increased Comity, 12 Colum. J. Eur. L.
713, 715 (2006).
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principles in case law results in a doctrine of unconstrained travel 2that
is
38
largely indebted to ideas of non-discrimination and equal citizenship."
Just as the word "travel" is not found in the Constitution, neither is
the word "commute."' 2 39 Nonetheless, just as the right to travel is a "virtually
unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all"'240 so
too is the right to pursue a common calling, unencumbered by protectionism
or discrimination of sister states. As the Court explained, "every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or
regulations exclude them.'241 This system benefits our national residents as
both producers and consumers, as the Court continued, "every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders;
242
such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality."
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and the Privilege and
Immunities clauses share a common origin and a common goal of
federalism, but the Privileges and Immunities Clause arguably has even more
lofty ambitions than the Commerce Clause. While the Commerce Clause is
concerned primarily with markets and economics, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause ("commercial flavor''243 though it may have) has as its
goal "social, economic, and political unity and national identity. '"244 The
protection from double taxation is "not based on the Interstate Commerce
Clause after Saenz, but on national citizenship, the right to travel
and
2 45
National Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment."

238. Id.
239. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (noting that the word "travel" is not
in the constitution).
240. Id.
241. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
242. Id.
243. Metzger, supra note 113, at 1503.
244. Francis J. Conte, Sink or Swim Together: Citizenship, Sovereignty,
and Free Movement in the European Union and the United States, 61 U. Miami L.
Rev. 331, 354 (2007) (arguing that "the American free movement is more robust
than that currently enjoyed within the European Union, and its animating purpose social, economic, and political unity and national identity - is much broader than the
European Union's 'economic integration' purpose.")
245. Jacob, supra note 189, at 1237. Jacob continues: "The bite of the state
'double taxation' that is inconsistent with national citizenship is that it becomes due
solely by reason of the several states' indifference to the taxpayer's reasons for
assigning residential and work places in different states." Id.
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Tax My Ride
II. CONCLUSION

If, as this article argues, the Constitution limits multiple taxation of
commuters' income, what solution is there for states? States must be
permitted to exercise their taxing power, and if a State chooses to do so, it
should be permitted to exercise that authority up to the constitutional limit.
One solution would be to require states to apportion source income - that is,
when two or more states have a legitimate claim to consider income
"sourced" to their state, those states could be required to apportion only a
percentage of that income to themselves. States are familiar with
apportionment of business taxation, and could apply that regime to the
taxation of individual income.24 5
Congress could solve the problem expeditiously by using its
Commerce Clause powers to put an end to discriminatory taxation. 4 6
Congress could require states to apportion source income, or perhaps a more
drastic, but more administratively feasible solution would be for Congress to
245. This apportionment argument is not unique to taxation, and in fact has
been applied to voting: Sanford V. Levinson "proposed that commuters and others
who have contacts with more than one state be allowed to vote in more than one
place, perhaps apportioning one vote over several jurisdictions." Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal & Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 337 n.142 (1992) (citing Sanford V.
Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 545, 55154 (1989)). Laycock agrees in principle to allowing commuters "to apportion a
single vote among more than one jurisdiction" but would "object only on grounds of
workability." Id.
246. This article does not attempt to address the question of whether
Congress could do the opposite-authorize discriminatory taxation of interstate
commuters' income. If the freedom from discriminatory taxation rests on the
Privileges and Immunities clauses, it is unlikely that the Congress could authorize
states to discriminate. Compare Michael P. O'Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our
Collective Amnesia about the History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 Ky.
L. J. 659, 719 (2005) ("Saenz v. Roe makes clear that congressional power is limited
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.") and Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping:
Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
1764, 1773-77 (2004) (arguing that Congress lacks authority to authorize Article IV
Privileges and Immunities violations) with Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV,
and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468 (2007) (exploring whether
Congress has the power to authorize states to engage in conduct that otherwise
would violate Article IV and concluding that in some circumstances, Congress does
have such power). If the only constitutional norm implicated is the Commerce
Clause, then it is more likely that Congress can authorize discrimination. But see
Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule" the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 153, 159 (2005) ("In short, the Dormant Commerce
Clause may not be overridden by Congress.").
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prohibit states from taxing the compensation of a nonresident when the
nonresident is not physically present in the state - as the proposed
Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2007 would do.247
Absent action from Congress, it is almost certain that courts will
continue to be called upon to resolve taxpayer challenges to discriminatory
taxation. Our changing economy and the lure of teleworking face off against
the increasing revenue needs of states, and the corresponding increase in
aggressive collection of taxes from outsiders.
"It is critical to the Union," Douglas Laycock recently urged, "that
we continue to think of ourselves as a single people, and it is important that
we not knowingly create legitimate interstate grievances. 248 Discriminatory,
or double, taxation of interstate commuters creates genuine grievances, and
by allowing those discriminatory taxes to run rampart over interstate
commuters, we undermine not only the economy, but also the Union. The
Constitution teaches that when state taxing power runs up against
preservation of the Union, the Union trumps every time.

247. Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 1360, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 785, 11 Oth Cong. (2007).
248. Laycock, supra note 22, at 264.
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